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Abstract
Charities often let the sum of contributions determine the quantity of services to
provide. Some organizations, however, have the option of setting a minimum threshold
necessary for provision of the public good, allowing donors to pledge donations contingent
on the threshold being reached. Contributions are only collected when su±cient funds
have been pledged. We show that contribution-maximizing fundraisers who have such a
strategy available to them will choose to use it. In contrast to the traditional model of
voluntary contributions, in this model ine±ciency arises as a result of over provision of
the public good.
Keywords: Provision Point Mechanism, Fundraising, Commitment to Refund, Over
Provision of Public Goods.
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11 Introduction
Fundraisers frequently announce a contribution goal at the beginning of their fundraising
campaign. Whilethesegoalsoften arenon-binding, therearesomecases wherethefundraiser
can choose a strategy that commits her to either reaching the goal or providing none of the
good. For instance, Bagnoli and Mckee (1991) present a case from Manitoba, Canada,
where the New Democratic Party in 1980 and 1985 sent letters to its larger contributors
soliciting additional funds to mount an upcoming election campaign. The letters stipulated
that a target had been set at $200,000 and that the New Democratic Party would refund all
contributions if the target were not reached by a certain date. Both campaigns succeeded.1
In thispaperwe determine whetherand how a fundraiser will employ a threshold strategy
similar to that described in the example above.2 That is, we examine a case where the
public good is continuous, and determine whether the fundraiser will want to arti¯cially
truncate the production function. This truncation is secured by setting a threshold for
total contributions, and by allowing donors to make contribution pledges contingent on the
threshold being reached. Alternatively, the fundraiser may collect contributions and refund
them if they fall short of the goal.3 The primary results of the paper arethat a contribution-
maximizing fundraiser who can commit to such a strategy always chooses to set a threshold,
and that the chosen threshold is \too high." Hence, the equilibrium of this game is one of
over provision of the public good.
The contribution game is similar to that commonly examined in the literature on private
provision of public goods: A ¯nite number of potential donors simultaneously allocate an
exogenous¯nite incomebetween consumption of a private good and contributions to a public
good, and an individual'sutility depends only on theconsumption levelsof private and public
goods.4 In such an environment the standard free-riding result holds, and there is under
1Other examples are presented in Bagnoli and Mckee as well as in Marks and Croson (1998) and Marks,
Schansberg and Croson (1999).
2A series of recent papers have examined the strategic role of the fundraiser. See for example Andreoni
(1998), Bac and Bag (1999a,b), Bilodeau and Slivinski (1997), Romano and Yildirim (1998), Slivinski and
Steinberg (1999), and Vesterlund (1999).
3Marks, Schansberg and Croson (1999) argue that these two mechanisms are isomorphic.
4See for example the seminal work of Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1989).
2provision of the public good. Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) show that this ine±ciency result
need not hold when a discrete public good is being provided. In fact, a simultaneous move
provision game with a simple refund rule secures e±cient provision.
Applying the same equilibrium concept as that of Bagnoli and Lipman (1989), we show
that their result may beextended to the case wherethepublicgood is continuous. In partic-
ular, when contributors have quasi-linear preferences, then a welfare-maximizing fundraiser
can secure e±cient provision by committing to a threshold and to refunding donations when
the threshold is not reached.
In many cases it is unlikely that the fundraiser's objective is to maximize social welfare.
Whilesomecontractsbetween theagency and thefundraiserdo not directly provideincentives
to maximize total contributions, there is no penalty for doing so.5 Hence, if the fundraiser's
promotion and future employment depends on her past success, then contribution maxi-
mization appears to be a reasonable assumption. With such an objective it is questionable
whether e±ciency will result when the fundraiser is able to use a provision point mechanism.
For a more general class of contributor preferences we show that a contribution-maximizing
fundraiser will choose to set the threshold at a level which exceeds e±cient provision. In
contrast to thestandard simultaneous problem, ine±ciency arises from over provision, rather
than under provision. Furthermore, when contributors do not have quasi-linear preferences,
then over provision may result even when the fundraiser is a potential donor who cares about
the provision level.
The paper is organized as follows. We ¯rst present the model, describing the contribu-
tion game for every threshold set by the fundraiser. Next, the equilibrium of the game is
examined and some of the model's comparative statics are determined. In contrast to the
standard simultaneous provision model, it is shown that an increase in the population need
not decrease the total provision level. We then discuss how sensitive the results are to the
fundraiser's objective and commitment ability. Finally, we show how threshold strategies can
be endogenous in competitive public good provision problems.
5See Slivinski and Steinberg (1999) for a discussion of contracts between the agency and the fundraiser.
32 The Model
The model is one of continuous provision of a public good, where a contribution-maximizing
fundraiser arti¯cially truncates the production function by setting a minimum threshold for
total donations. If thethreshold is not reached, all contributions are returned to the respec-
tive donors. The optimal threshold choice depends on whether the fundraiser can commit
to refunding all contributions when the threshold is not met and whether the fundraiser can
commit to not accepting donations that are made after the refund. We start by considering
a full-commitment game, where the fundraiser commits to returning all contributions if they
do not meet the threshold and will refuseto accept donationsfollowing the refund. Following
this analysis we consider a more realistic scenario where the fundraiser, after having made
the refund, accepts voluntary donations. We refer to this level of commitment as partial
commitment.
2.1 The Full-Commitment Game
Let n be a ¯nite number of potential donors, and let each be endowed with an exogenous
¯nite and strictly positive endowment, wi. Each donor allocates his endowment between a
private good, xi, and contributions to a public good, gi. The game has an additional player:
the fundraiser. The fundraiser's objective is to maximize contributions, and she has only
one choice variable: the selection of a threshold, T, below which the contributions will be
refunded. The fundraiser can commit to refund all contributions if the threshold is not met,
and, in addition, she can commit to not accepting any other donations after the refund.
Once the fundraiser has chosen T, the n players simultaneously contribute to the public
good, choosing gF
i (T) 2 [0;wi], where the superscript F refers to the fact that we are ex-












When the threshold isnot met thecontributions arerefunded and no publicgood is provided.
4Thus, the consumption of the private good is:
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There is no monetary rebate and contributions in excess of the threshold are used to provide
more of the public good.6 In this event we assume that the production function is linear,
however this assumption is without loss of generality.7




i (T)gi=1;:::;n)), which is continuous, strictly
quasi concave, twice continuously di®erentiable, and monotonically increasing in both argu-
ments. As is standard in the literature we assumethat all playershavecomplete information.
If thereis no fundraiser, or if equivalently thethreshold is set equal to zero, then the game
is identical to the standard simultaneous contribution game, and a unique Nash equilibrium
is guaranteed by assuming that both the private and the public goods are normal goods.8
Denotetheunique Nash equilibrium contribution pro¯le when T = 0 by fg¤
igi=1;:::;n. In order
to ensure that the equilibrium provision level remains unique even when T >0, we will use
the same re¯nement used by Bagnoli and Lipman (1989), namely the Undominated Perfect
Equilibrium concept. This equilibrium concept eliminates dominated strategies and applies
thenotion of perfection to the resulting game. Whileperfection alone can rule out equilibria
where the sum of contributions exceed the threshold, it is not su±cient to rule out the many
ine±cient Nash equilibria where the threshold is not reached. If however all dominated
strategies are eliminated before applying perfection then these ine±cient Nash equilibria can
be ruled out.9
6Marks and Croson (1998) refer to this as a Utilization Rebate.
7This standard approach simply corresponds to having incorporated the production function into the utility
function. Whether we solve the problem with individual utility functions of the form Vi(xi;f(
P
gi)) (for some
production function f(¢)) or Ui(xi;
P
gi) will not a®ect our results.
8See Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1989).
9When there is a discrete unit of a public good, Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) show that e±ciency may
be secured through a mechanism where contributions in excess of the necessary funds are con¯scated and
insu±cient contributions refunded (alternatively, a rebate of excess contributions may be o®ered, as long
as increasing one's contribution never increases one's rebate more than one-for-one). They show that the
52.2 The Partial-Commitment Game
In thefull-commitment gamedescribed above, thepublicgood provision level iszero whenever
the threshold is not met (i.e. GF =0 ). A more realistic assumption is that if the threshold
is not met, then the donors are free to contribute as much as they want. That is, they can
always contribute what they would have donated in the absence of the threshold. We refer
to this game as the partial-commitment game. Let the individual contributions in this case
be denoted by gP
i (T). The partial-commitment game is very similar to the full-commitment
game. The only di®erence between thetwo, is that following a refund, there is an additional
contribution stage of the game. This stage is identical to the standard simultaneous-move
contribution game, and there is a unique continuation equilibrium where every player gives
g¤














Fortheanalysisofboth thegamesdescribed aboveweneed to imposethreemoreassumptions.
Assumption 1 Ui(0;wi+
P
j6=igj) ￿ Ui(wi;0), 8fgjgj6=i, 8i.
Assumption 2 There exists a gi > 0 such that Ui(wi ¡gi;gi) >Ui(wi;0) 8i.
unique Undominated Perfect Equilibrium of the game is one of e±cient provision. Extending the problem to
provision ofmultiple units complicates the analysis. Ingeneral, there are no Nash equilibria ofthe simultaneous
contribution and refund game that implement e±cient provision. However when preferences are quasi linear
Bagnoli and Lipman show that e±ciency is secured in a game where contributions are made sequentially.
In particular contributions are raised for one unit at a time, and fundraising ends whenever donations are
insu±cient to pay for the next unit. In this case undominated perfect equilibria do not fully implement the
e±cient outcome, which is, on the other hand, fully implemented in successively undominated strictly perfect
equilibria (obtained by successively eliminating dominated strategies and applying strict perfection to the
resulting game). Although there is some experimental support for the one-unit case (see Bagnoli and McKee
1991), there is no experimental support for the multiple-unit case (Bagnoli, Ben-David and McKee (1992).
10Equivalently, one could describe the partial-commitment game exactly like the full-commitment game,




i ; every time the threshold is not met.
6Assumption 1 implies that, independent of the size of the contributions of the other
players, each consumer weakly prefers consuming none of thepublicgood to consuming none
of the private good. Assumption 2 requires that individuals care enough about the public
good to make a positive contribution in the event that nobody else does.11
The next assumption is a behavioral one:
Assumption 3 If an individual is indi®erent between two donations and if his choice is
pivotal to reaching a threshold, then he chooses the contribution that reaches the threshold:
1. If Ui(wi ¡~ gF




j ) = Ui(wi;0) for some fgjgj6=i, then ~ gF
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any g
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2. If Ui(wi¡~ gP

















This section characterizes the equilibria of the two games. The basic properties of the two
games are very similar, and it is convenient to start with the simpler one. Hence we ¯rst
consider the full-commitment game, where the fundraiser can commit to rejecting contribu-
tions that are made following a refund. Then we examine the more realistic case where the
fundraiser accepts the donations that are made after the refunds.
3.1 Full Commitment
Suppose that the fundraiser can commit to refunding insu±cient funds and not accepting
subsequent donations. Then the production of the public good is given by the discontinuous
function GF(¢; ¢). The truncated production function is illustrated in Figure 1, where T¤ is
the fundraiser's chosen threshold.
Let T = G =
Pn
i=1 g¤
i denote the contribution level that corresponds to the traditional
simultaneous contribution level. Let G
F






2, with wi > a > 0 8i, is an example of a utility function that satis¯es these two
assumptions.
7contributors are exactly indi®erent between meeting the threshold and getting none of the








gi) = Ui(wi;0) 8i (4)
We ¯rst show that there exists a contribution level G
F where (4) holds for all i. Then we
show that the contribution level G
F is unique.
Lemma 1 There exists G
F ´
Pn
i=1gi >0 such that Ui(wi ¡gi;
Pn
i=1 gi) =Ui(wi; 0) 8i.
Proof. Let us ¯rst characterize the set of n indi®erence curves Ui(wi¡gi; gi+
P
j6=igj) =
Ui(wi; 0). Figure 2 shows an example of contributor i's indi®erence curve. The sum of
contributions by others, G¡i =
P
j6=igj; is on the vertical axis, and i's contribution, gi,
on the horizontal axis. Monotonicity and strict quasi concavity of Ui(¢;¢) imply that i's
indi®erence curve bounds a strictly convex set, and is U-shaped. For all G¡i > 0 and
gi > 0, the indi®erence curve Ui(wi ¡gi;G¡i +gi) = Ui(wi; 0) is an increasing and concave
function, gi =fi(G¡i). Continuity of Ui implies that fi is continuous in G¡i. Assumption 1
implies that fi(G¡i) is bounded above by wi. By Assumption 2 we know that there exists a
gi =fi(0) > 0. For su±ciently small ² > 0, let A =fy 2 Rn : ² ￿ yi ￿ wi; i =1; :: :;ng. A is
clearly a compact and convex set. By Assumption 2 weknow that the functions gi =fi(G¡i)
are continuous functions from A into itself. Hence, by Brouwer's ¯xed point theorem, there
must exist a ¯xed point fgigi=1;:::;n, such that Ui(wi¡gi;
Pn
i=1 gi) = Ui(wi;0) 8i. This ¯xed
point contribution pro¯le results in a total provision level G
F >0. QED.
Lemma 2 There is a unique positive contribution level G
F ´
Pn








0 such that Ui(wi; 0) =Ui(wi¡gi;
Pn
i=1gi) 8i: Suppose there are two such levels, and denote
them by G and G
0. Assume, without loss of generality, that G < G
0: Call fgigi=1;:::;n the
contribution pro¯le such that
Pn






0 and (4) holds. We will use the notation of the previous proof,
i.e., gi =fi(G¡i) 8i and g0
i =fi(G0
¡i) 8i.
8Strict quasi concavity and monotonicity of the utility function imply that f0
i > 0 and
f00
i < 0. Hence, if there exist two positive contribution levels, G and G
0, which everyone
views as good asUi(wi; 0), then monotonicity implies that g0











This implies that each individual gives a smaller share of the total provision level at G
0 than




















It is not possible to have a G
0
>G satisfying (4) if G satis¯es it. QED.
In order to characterize the equilibrium of the full-commitment game we ¯rst determine
the undominated perfect equilibrium (UPE) of the subgame that follows the announcement
of a threshold. In particular, it is necessary to characterize the continuation equilibrium
pro¯le fgi(T)gi=1;:::;n and the corresponding provision function GF(T; fgi(T)gi=1;:::;n). Once
it has been determined how contributions change with the threshold, then the fundraiser's
optimal threshold at the ¯rst stage can be determined.
Lemma 3 For every T there is a unique UPE provision level GF (T).
1. If T ￿ G; then the UPE contribution pro¯le is fg¤





2. If T 2 (G;G
F]; then all the UPE contribution pro¯les fgF
i (T)gi=1;:::;n are such that
Pn
i=1 gF
i (T) =T, and hence GF(T) = T;
3. If T > G
F then GF (T) =0:
Proof.
91. Since thethreshold constraint does not bind when T ￿ G, the equilibrium contribution
will beidentical to that of a game with no threshold. Due to thenormality assumption,
the Nash equilibrium without a threshold is unique, and gF
i (T) =g¤






i =G for any T ￿ G. Obviously, this unique Nash equilibrium is
also the unique UPE.
2. If T 2 (G;G
F] then GF (T) = T. Let us ¯rst show that thereexists a Nash equilibrium
where T is reached. If T ￿ G
F
, it follows that there must exist contribution pro¯les
fgi(T)gi=1;:::;n such that
Pn
i=1gi(T) = T and Ui(wi ¡gi(T);T) ¸ Ui(wi;0) 8i (with
strict inequality if T <G
F ). No player i has a pro¯table deviation g0
i < gi(T) from any
such pro¯le, since such deviation would entail no provision of public good. Similarly
there are no deviations with g0
i > gi(T) for any i. This can be seen by noting that
when G >G it must be the case that @Ui
@G ￿ @Ui
@xi .
Next, we show that GF(T) = T is the unique UPE provision level. Since no donor
will contribute a g0
i > gi(T) therecannot be equilibria where the threshold is exceeded.
Also there can not be UPE where the threshold is not reached. As in Bagnoli and
Lipman (1989), thereareine±cient Nash equilibria where the good fails to be provided.
However, as in their analysis, only equilibria that reach the threshold are UPE.12
3. In order to have
Pn
i=1 gF
i (T) > G
F we would need Ui(wi;0) < Ui(wi ¡gF
i (T);T) for
some i, however by construction of G
F this is not possible. Thus, for this range of
thresholds theredoes not exist an equilibrium where contributions reach the threshold.
QED.
The ¯ndings of Lemma 3 are summarized in Figure 3. When the threshold is less than
the standard Nash equilibrium level, it has no e®ect on the contribution level. Once the
threshold is past this level, total contributions increase in a one-to-one fashion until the
threshold surpasses G
F, at which point the provision level drops to 0. When T 2 (G; G
F
]
all equilibria result in a contribution level that exactly equals the threshold. Note that in
general the contribution pro¯le is unique only when T =G
F:
12Assumption 3 secures the positive contribution pro¯le even when T = G
F: Without this assumption there
would be a large number of equilibria that all fail in providing the public good.
10It is now straightforward to solvethe¯rst stageof thegameand determinetheequilibrium
threshold choice, T¤:
Proposition 1 If the fundraiser is able to commit to refund contributions and end the cam-
paign when the threshold is not reached, then she will always choose T¤ =G
F. The ensuing
equilibrium is Pareto inferior to the continuation equilibria of any other T < G
F.
Proof. Thefundraiser'sobjectiveistomaximizetotal contributions. Hence, by monotonic-
ity of GF(T) when T 2 [G;G
F], the fundraiser will choose T¤ =G
F.
We know from Lemma 2 that there is a unique G
F
such that everybody is indi®erent





F, i.e., Ui(wi ¡gF
i (G
F);G
F) = Ui(wi; 0) 8i: Obviously there does not exist an
equilibrium where a consumer receives a utility level less than Ui(wi;0). In the case where
T > G
F none of the public good is provided, so Ui = Ui(wi; 0) 8i: However, when T < G
F
the UPE secure provision and a utility level of Ui(wi ¡gF
i (T); T) ¸Ui(wi; 0) 8i, with strict
inequality for somei. Hence, any of thecontinuation UPE that arises when T <G
F
is Pareto
superior to the equilibrium contribution pro¯le at G
F.13 QED.
The equilibrium threshold T¤ = G
F
and the contribution pro¯le fgF
i (T¤)gi=1;:::;n con-
stitute the unique UPE of the overall game. That is, there is no coordination problem {
everyone gives their most and everyone is pivotal to the public good being provided. The
contribution-maximizing fundraiser's choice of G
F
is ine±cient, but, in sharp contrast to
past results on the private provision of public goods, the ine±ciency arises as a result of over
provision rather than under provision of the public good.
Given that the fundraiser does not choose an e±cient outcome, one may wonder wether
a benevolent planner can secure an e±cient provision of the public good by committing to
a threshold. Let fg¤¤
i gi=1;:::;n denote a Pareto e±cient contribution pro¯le. Knowing that










question is whether it is possible to induce a fg¤¤
i gi=1;:::;n by setting a threshold and o®ering a
refund when contributions fall short of this goal. Generally the answer is no, because for any
13The fundraiser's utility is obviously not counted in the welfare comparison.
11T 2 (G;G
F ) there exist multiple equilibria, and the planner cannot secure any one of these
outcomes simply by setting T.14 Furthermore, since the e±cient provision level generally




i . One exception arises when preferences are quasi linear (Ui = xi +Vi(G)).
Proposition 2 If all individuals have quasi-linear utility functions, then there is a unique





Proof. If a contribution pro¯le fg¤¤
i gi=1;:::;n is Pareto e±cient then the Samuelson condi-







=1. In the case where preferences




@G =1, and is independent of the




results in the Pareto e±cient provision level of the public good. QED.
Recall that Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) focused on the case where subjects have quasi-
linear preferences. Given this type of preferences they show that the UPE is e±cient in the
case where there is one discrete unit of the public good. Unfortunately this re¯nement is
insu±cient at securing e±cient provision when there are multiple discrete units of the public
good, and subjects freely contribute to thegood. In ourcasewhere the fundraiserarti¯cially
truncates the production function, the problem is however similar to that of a discrete unit
and as a result UPE is a su±cient re¯nement to secure e±cient provision.
14A welfare-maximizing planner who has the power to choose his preferred mechanism would obviously
prefer to set individual thresholds rather than an aggregate threshold. Individual thresholds would, under
complete information, allow the social planner to obtain the e±cient contribution pro¯le. On the other hand, a
contribution-maximizing fundraiser wouldnever bene¯t from substituting aggregate thresholds with individual
ones.
123.2 Partial Commitment
Let us now analyze the case in which the fundraiser accepts voluntary donations after the
refund. In this casethe consequenceof not meeting the threshold is no longer zero provision
of the public good, but rather a contribution level that is identical to the Nash contribution








gi) = Ui(wi ¡g¤
i; G) 8i: (5)
Existence and uniqueness is easily extended to the partial-commitment game. The only







￿ 1 . For given G¡i > G¤
¡i; the set of points that individual i views as being
indi®erent to (wi ¡g¤
i; G) is a monotonically increasing and concave function gi = fi(G¡i),
with gi > g¤
i: Hence, if we rede¯ne the set A to be A = fy in Rn : ² +g¤
i ￿ yi ￿ wi for
i = 1;:::; ng; then it is easy to see that G
P
exists. Similarly one can easily extend Lemma 2
to show that G
P is unique.
In determining the equilibria of this case it is important to note that the only di®erence
between partial commitment and full commitment is in the value of the outside option, i.e.,
the utility experienced when the threshold is not met. A small decrease in an individual's
contribution will trigger the refund and bring the total contribution level down to the simul-
taneous contribution level with no threshold. It is therefore apparent that the character of
the results found for full commitment carries over to the case of partial commitment.
Lemma 3':With partial commitment, for every T there is a unique UPE provision level
GP(T) such that








i (T) = T;
3. For T >G
P; GP(T) = G:
Similar to thefull-commitment game, thefundraiser will choose the threshold that results
in the highest provision level. Asshown in Lemma 3', GP(T) increases up to thepoint where
13T = G
P, and thus the fundraiser will indeed choose T¤ = G
P: Since Ui(wi ¡ gi(T); T)
¸ Ui(wi ¡ g¤
i;G) for all T 2 (G; G
P], a contribution-maximizing fundraiser will choose a
threshold such that the resulting contribution level is ine±ciently large.
All the above guarantees the following general result:
Theorem 1 If a contribution-maximizing fundraiser has access to either partial or full com-
mitment, then the public good is over provided in any Undominated Perfect Equilibrium.
4 Population Size
An interesting question ishow an increasein population sizea®ects theprovision of thepublic
good. Theclassical privateprovision of publicgoods model, where agents derive utility solely
fromtheirconsumption of theprivateand publicgood, predictsthat the average contribution
approaches zero as the population increases. Andreoni (1988) shows that as the population
gets larger the total provision of the public good remains ¯nite, and that the fraction of
the population contributing to the good declines monotonically with n. If preferences are
identical, only the wealthiest individuals will contribute in the limit.15
An interesting featureof our model is that it presents a case where individuals contribute
to the public good even as the economy gets large. In fact the model predicts that each and
every individual who cares about the publicgood alwaysmakesa contribution in equilibrium.
The reason is that in both the full- and partial-commitment games the threshold results in
provision levels that exceed that of the outside option, and that each contributor must be
indi®erent between reaching the threshold, and receiving a refund. Hence, independent of n;
it must be the case that every individual is making a strictly positive contribution.
The intuition is shown graphically in Figure 4. In the full-commitment and partial-
commitment games, the fundraiser can extract the highest possible contribution level from
the consumer. This implies that the new equilibrium results in higher contributions than the
outside option, but will bealong the same indi®erence curveas theoutside option. Since the
indi®erence curve crosses the outside option bundle from above (be it (wi; 0) or (wi ¡g¤
i; G)
15As pointed out by Andreoni (1988) this prediction makes the Red Cross, the Salvation Army and PBS
logical impossibilities.
14and because preferences are strictly convex, all consumers will make contributions to the
good when T = G.
Furthermore, in thefull-commitment case it is also possible to determine how an increase
in n a®ects the total and individual contribution levels.
Proposition 3 In the full-commitment game the individual and total contribution increase
with n.
Proof. Suppose n = n0 and T0 =
Pn
i=1 gF
i (n0); where gF
i (n0) is such that Ui(wi ¡
gF
i (n0);T0) = Ui(wi; 0) 8i. Suppose an additional individual j is added to the popula-
tion, such that n= n00. First, we note that by monotonicity and assumption 1 it will be the
case that for any positive threshold (T00 ) gF
j (n00) > 0 for Uj(wj ¡gF
j (n00); T00) = Uj(wj; 0).
Second, we want to show that it is possible for the fundraiser to choose a T00 >T0. Suppose
T00 =T0, then given that gF
j (n00) > 0, it must be the case that some contributor k decreases
his contribution and therefore Uk(wk ¡gF
k (n00);T0) >Uk(wk ¡gF
k (n0); T0) =Uk(wk; 0), hence
the fundraiser can increase his threshold past T0.
With a T00 > T0 we note that Ui(wi ¡ gF
i (n0);T00) > Ui(wi ¡gF
i (n0);T0) = Ui(wi; 0),
8i 6= j. Therefore the threshold T00 is set at a level where each individual i0s contribution
gF
i (n00) >gF
i (n0); i =1; ::;n0. QED.
In thefull-commitment gametheoutsideoption is una®ected by thesizeof thepopulation,
and it is therefore only necessary to examine how an increase in n a®ects G
F
. If we add one
more contributor, this individual obviously has to make a contribution for (4) to hold. This
increasein G¡i weakly increases everyone'scontribution. Hence, in the full-commitment case
total contributions are increasing with n.
It is somewhat more di±cult to determine what happens when n increases in the partial-
commitment game. The reason is that an increase in n weakly increases the attractiveness
of the outside option. As the population increases, the individual contribution following a
refund weakly decreases, and the fundraiser is no longer able to extract the same amount of
surplus from the individuals who contribute following a refund. Therefore it is possible that
an increase in n results in a decrease in the contributions by these individuals. This potential
decrease implies that we also areunable to characterize the change in contributions for those
15who are non-contributors following a refund. Naturally if the increase in population leaves
the set of contributors following a refund unchanged, then the outside option is una®ected
and Proposition 3 extends to the partial-commitment game.16 That is, in this particular
case individual contributions increase with n:
5 Contributing Fundraiser and Credibility
In theaboveanalysis wehaveassumed that theperson choosing thethreshold is someonewho
only cares about total contributions. However, in some cases it might be more reasonable to
assumethat theperson choosing thethreshold cares about the publicgood, and therefore isa
potential contributor. Oneexamplemay bethedirectorof thecharity'sboard. Let us denote
this individual by D and assume that she has a utility function UD(xD;GD). In choosing
the threshold, TD, the director will aim at maximizing her objective function subject to her
budget constraint and the individual rationality constraints of the other contributors. Let
us assume that the director has partial commitment, hence the set of individual rationality




i;G). Thequestion of interest is whetherthedirector's
preferred threshold di®ers from that of a donation maximizing fundraiser, and in particular
whether the resulting equilibrium may result in over provision.
If the director had the power to choose a particular contribution pro¯le, then she would
pick a pro¯le such that the individual rationality constraint binds for all other contributors.
That is shewould choosethepoint whereherindi®erencecurveistangent to the set of outside
option indi®erence curves for everyone else. Let us denote this contribution level by G
D
and
the director's resulting utility level by UD. Obviously this particular contribution pro¯le is
Pareto e±cient.
Not surprisingly the director cannot secure this contribution pro¯le by simply setting a
threshold of G
D. Rather this threshold will result in a continuum of equilibria that all have
16Recall that Andreoni (1988) showed that when the population is su±ciently large and preferences are
identical then only the wealthiest individuals contribute to the public good. In our model this implies that an
increase in the population which does not a®ect the size of the wealthiest class, will leave the outside option
constant, and result in an increase in individual contributions towards the threshold.
16contribution levels that meet the threshold, and where everyone is no worse o® than in the
no threshold scenario. Given that there exists a continuum of equilibria, it is not clear what
the director's preferred threshold will be.
If we assume the possible equilibria that may result at a given threshold are equally
likely, then the director will indeed maximize his expected utility by choosing TD = G
D.
The reason is that independent of the chosen threshold she will reach a minimum utility of
UD(wD ¡g¤
D; G). As she moves closer to G
D, less mass gets attributed to the lower utility
levels, and equilibria that result in a higher utility level become likely, with the maximum
utility UD being reached at a threshold of GD. Now given a threshold of G
D
there exists at
least one equilibrium which is Pareto e±cient. Namely the director's preferred contribution
pro¯le. However in general the other equilibria will not be Pareto e±cient and the resulting
equilibrium may be one of either over or under provision of the public good.17
When the threshold-determining individual cares about the public good, the preferred
threshold is one that results in a higher social welfare than when no threshold is chosen,
however the resulting equilibrium may still be one of over provision of the public good.
Anotherimportant question iswhen wemay expect fundraisers to usea threshold strategy.
There are two variables that certainly a®ect the likelihood and the e®ectiveness of such a
strategy. First of all, it is easier to commit to a threshold if the charity has established
credibility with the donors and there is going to be repeated interaction between them.18 If
the game is not a repeated game, or, in general, if a charity does not haveany credibility, full
commitment is impossible. Partial commitment may be easier to obtain since the promise
17One case in which the all the equilibria will result in the Pareto e±cient provision level is the case where
everyone has quasi-linear preferences.
18Assuming that the fundraiser's discount factor is su±ciently large, one can demonstrate that there is a
sustainable equilibrium where contributors give up to the threshold. For simplicity, let us ¯rst examine the
case where contributors have quasi-linear preferences, such that there is a unique Pareto e±cient provision
level. In this case a welfare-maximizing fundraiser chooses the Pareto e±cient provision level as the threshold.
If the contributions reach the threshold the donors will get payo®s that exceed the payo®s they achieve in the
absence of the threshold, as well as their minimax payo®s. Since this outcome is in the convex hull of feasible
and individual-rational outcomes, the outcome is sustainable in an in¯nitely repeated game (Fudenberg and
Maskin (1986)). If we instead consider a contribution-maximizing fundraiser, then by continuity there must
be a maximum threshold between the e±cient one and T, such that the same folk theorem applies.
17of not collecting pledged contributions can be written on observable and veri¯able contracts,
while the subsequent voluntary contributions cannot be stopped in any way. The second
important variable is competition: if a charity is a monopolist in the provision of a given
public good, then it is possible to set an ine±ciently large threshold. However when many
charities compete to provide a given public good the threshold is what they compete about,
and it will not be possible to succeed with a threshold of G: In the example of the New
Democratic Party from Canada given in the introduction, it appears that both of these
requirements were satis¯ed: the fundraiser was a monopolist collector for the party with
credibility given by the repeated-game nature of election campaigns. 19
6 Thresholds through Competition
So far, we have characterized the properties of a contribution game where the presence of a
strategicfundraiser, who can commit to enforcea minimumthreshold, leads to overprovision.
The objective of this section is to demonstrate that a threshold may arise endogenously in
the absence of a fundraiser, and that it too can result in over provision. In particular,
competition for a public good, or for its location, among di®erent groups of individuals may
generate a truncated production function similar to that generated by the threshold-setting
fundraiser. We will display this similarity by examining a simple \competitive public good"
provision game.
Consider a publicgood which has both local and global bene¯ts. A hospital, for instance,
may bene¯t all citizens of a country, but it certainly increases the utility of the region where
19The logic of this result applies also to many other contexts. First, consider a team-production process,
where moral hazard is the main source of a free-riding problem similar to the one experienced in the production
of public goods. Consider for example a team of engineers trying to develop a new engine. There, once again,
if the principal is able to commit to a minimum standard, credibly claiming that the engine will not be used
(and hence the agents will not be compensated) if the minimum standard is not reached, then the principal
should setthis standard at the highest possible level (satisfying (4)), and the e®ort of each agent would become
pivotal, so that the free-riding problem is eliminated and, as a consequence, the principal reaches his objective
and the agents have a lower welfare than in the free-riding equilibrium without thresholds. An example of this
procedure is given by Toyota, where it is often the case that very high standards result in employees excerting
a high level of e®ort.
18it is built more than any other region. Let us examine a small country with two regions,
A and B, where the government is committed to building one hospital. To simplify the
example we assume that the production technology is such that at least $K is needed for
the hospital's provision, and any additional funds causes an increase in either the quality or
the size of the hospital, i.e. once $K is contributed the hospital can take on a continuum of
values. The government has pledged $K, but wants the largest hospital possible and must
also decide where to locate the hospital. We assume for simplicity that neither region is able
to raise su±cient funds on their own.
There are of course many di®erent ways in which the government can choose between
these locations. One is to base the location decision on which of the two regions pledges the
larger amount of additional funds to the construction of the hospital. There are two bene¯ts
to letting the two groups of citizens compete. First it helps determine which region values
a local hospital the most, and second it may result in the construction of a larger and better
hospital than would otherwise be possible. The particular strategy that we have in mind is
the following: the government announces that it will build the hospital in the region where
the sum of the pledges made by the local residents is higher, and that it will add $K to the
contributions made by the citizens in that region. Ties will be broken with a coin toss.
In each region, a simultaneous pledging game takes place after this announcement, and
then the government observesthe two totals and follows it'scontingent plan. We will denote
the citizens in region j = A;B by i = 1;:::; n; and let the competing region be denoted by
k. Citizens can be thought to have preferences of the form Ui(xi; Gj;Gk). For simplicity
we assume that Ui(xi; Gj;Gk) = Ui(xi; Gj;0) and we will simply denote i's preferences by
Ui(xi; Gj): Finally, in order to avoid limit arguments, assume that the smallest possible
individual contribution is ² { say, one penny.
Now let ¹ Tj <K be the value of the total sum of pledges in region j that can be obtained
by having everybody contribute to the point where they are all indi®erent between getting
nothing and getting Gj = ¹ Tj +K, i.e.,
Ui(wi¡gi; ¹ Tj +K) =Ui(wi; 0) 8i 2 j:
We know by Lemma 1 and 2 that ¹ Tj exists and is unique. Generically, ¹ TA 6= ¹ TB. Assume
¹ TA > ¹ TB, and that in the absence of competition the voluntary donations in region A are
19less than ¹ TB, i.e.
P
i2A g¤
i < ¹ TB. Then, it is easy to show that:
Proposition 4 The unique Nash equilibrium outcome of the competitive public good provi-
sion game is one where region A gets a public good of value ¹ TB +² +K. All the equilibrium
pro¯les are such that (I) the residents of region A contribute a total of ¹ TB +² and (II) the
residents of region B pledge a total of ¹ TB.
It can be easily checked that nobody has pro¯table deviations from any such pro¯le.20
The proof of uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome is equally trivial, hence it is omitted.
It is also easy to see, given the analysis above, that the unique equilibrium outcome of
the competitive public good provision game may result in over provision. Similar to the
contribution-maximizing fundraiser, the endogenous threshold in this competitive provision
problem may push people to contribute an ine±ciently large amount.21
The competitive provision model analyzed here could be used to model campaign ¯nanc-
ing: considerfor examplea potential candidatewho is trying to raise fundsfor her campaign,
and interprets the two regions as being groups of people who would want this candidate to
choose a speci¯c type of policy as the campaign focus. For example, one group of contrib-
utors would like to see the candidate defending a right-to-bear-arms policy and the other
group would like this same candidate to advocate pro-life policies. In this case the match
with the competitive provision story is perfect. Even without commitment to thresholds,
the candidate can ask for pledges from the two groups, similar to above, and then collect
contributions only from the group pledging the most.
7 Conclusion
The help of a welfare-maximizing social planer in some circumstances can secure e±cient
private provision of the public good. Unfortunately agents who actually take the role of
mechanism designers are rarely trying to maximize the welfare of the game's participants.
Rather, the goal of a fundraiser is probably more often one of contribution maximization.
20We are implicitly assuming that pledges are costless.
21Of course it is also possible to get over provision when the production technology is everywhere increasing.






i) rather than Ui(wi;0):
20Fundraisers with such motivations naturally prefer over provision and we have shown that
they can secure such an outcome by commiting to refund donations if they do not reach a
certain threshold. The commitment to refund is more likely to be credible if a fundraiser
does not have competitors and if there is a positive probability that the same fundraiser will
run a similar campaign in the future. However, competition may cause thresholds to arise
endogenously, and in these cases the threshold is credible.
After a refund donors still have an incentive to contribute, and we suspect that few
fundraisers will have the commitment ability to reject these voluntary and unconditional
contributions. Even the weaker level of commitment results in over provision of the public
good. If the extreme commitment level is also available, then the over provision is so large
that contributors areworse o® than in the standard simultaneous contribution gamewithout
a threshold.
Interestingly in our model thetotal and individual contributions increase when the popu-
lation increases, which is the exact opposite of what we predict in the absence of a threshold.
Similarly, one can show that an increase in government donations results in crowding in,
rather than the crowding out typically predicted when fundraisers' strategies are not taken
into account. These comparative statics results suggest that one may be able to obtain





Figure 1: Truncated production of the public good.
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Figure 3: The e®ect of the threshold on donations.
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Figure 4: Indi®erence curves for partial and full commitment.
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